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New Labour and the Theory of Globalisation1 
 
Michael Rustin 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article argues that the theoretical basis of the New Labour project was 
sociological in its framing, drawing in particular on the ideas of Anthony Giddens. 
The theory of globalisation, individualisation and risk advanced by him and others  
became the rationale for New Labour’s  rejection of ‘traditional’ socialist and 
welfare ideologies, holding the collectivist, materialist and class-based politics 
that these had upheld to be now obsolete. However it is argued  that Marxist 
analytic perspectives retain their relevance in understanding the dynamics of 
what is more clearly understood as global capitalism than in the more diffuse 
language  of globalisation.  The concept of systemic contradiction developed by 
sociologists such as  David Lockwood in the 1980s  retains its  relevance as an 
analytical resource  in contemporary capitalist society.  
 
  
 
 
 
                                            
 
1
 A version of this paper was given as a contribution to a plenary panel on  ‘Sociology, Politics 
and Public Policy in 21st Century Britain’,  with Anthony Giddens and Sue Duncan,  at the British 
Sociological Association’s Annual Conference in April  14  2007 at the University of East London.    
A shorter version of this article was published in the British Sociological Assocation’s Network No 
98., Autumn-Winter 2007.    
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One under-recognised difference between the era of Thatcherism and that of 
New Labour lies in the theoretical frameworks which justified  these two political 
projects.  The intellectual authorities by which the Thatcherites were inspired  
were primarily free-market economists, such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich 
Hayek. The discipline of sociology was their particular bête noire,  being held 
responsible (not altogether unreasonably it must be said) for the legitimation of 
social democratic  concerns about inequality, social injustice, and the necessity 
for an active role of the state in redressing such  wrongs. Thatcher’s aphorism, 
‘there is no such thing as society, only individuals and their families’ can be taken 
as her summary denunciation  of sociology and all its works. The role of 
sociology students and departments in the headier conflicts of the 1970s, and the 
reputation which they acquired   as a  vanguard of revolutionary radicalism, no 
doubt also played a part in the marginalisation of this discipline. The fact that the 
former Social Science Research Council had to be renamed by Sir Keith Joseph, 
the Economic and Social Research Council, summed up this ideological intent, 
with  its  positively Stalinist ruthlessness about acceptable and unacceptable 
nomenclatures.  
 
Because New Labour has been in many ways committed to market society and 
the disciplines deemed necessary to it, the fact that it has relied on a rather 
different disciplinary underpinning has been less obvious. But that is 
nevertheless the case. Its most influential social theorist has been not an 
economist but  the most prolific and widely read British sociologist of his 
generation, Anthony, now Lord,   Giddens. The concepts which have shaped 
New Labour thinking have been ideas of globalisation, individualisation, risk, and 
the knowledge economy’ to which  Tony  Giddens has made a major 
contribution, both in their development  and their promulgation.  In Over To You 
Mr Brown, (2007) Giddens’  contribution to the transition in New Labour 
leadership, these ideas retain the salience they have had in  his long sequence 
of political writing since the publication of The Third Way in 1998, on more or less 
the same day as a Fabian Pamphlet by Tony Blair which had the self-same title.  
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So if we are to understand the New Labour project, we need to understand this 
underpinning theoretical analysis, and  to understand what it both includes and 
excludes, by way of social facts and  social dynamics.  The intellectual choice 
which has been crucial to New Labour’s development has in fact been the choice 
of ‘globalisation’ as the central idea through which its thinking  is organised, and 
the total exclusion from its agendas of the idea of capitalism as a still-existing 
dynamic system.  Giddens once wrote an excellent textbook, called Capitalism 
and Modern Social Theory, (1971)  which correctly described the development of 
sociology in terms of debates between its three most important classical thinkers, 
Durkheim, Marx and Weber. Plainly differences concerning the nature and 
prospects of capitalism both needed to be and were central to this analysis.  
Later, Giddens wrote a number of substantial theoretical treatises, from a broadly 
neo-Weberian point of view, whose purpose was to refute Marxist theoretical 
principles, substituting a pluralist conception of competing forms of power for 
Marxist claims for the dominant role of the means and relations of production. 
One of these texts was called A Contemporary Critique of Historical 
Materialism(1981) making it plain how central this goal  was in Giddens’ work. By 
the time the arguments for a Third Way appears, capitalism has virtually 
disappeared as a mentionable subject.  ‘Globalisation’ in effect takes its place, as 
the main descriptor of the ambient system. Globalisation is seen  as a system of 
expanded economic competition, to which all national economies including 
Britain’s are increasingly exposed. It is also seen as a system of communications 
which is transforming life-worlds, dissolving old collective identities (such as 
those of class or community) and engendering new and more individualised 
identities of subjects,  as consumers, ‘active citizens’ and the like.  New Labour’s 
programme has been substantially one of adaptation to these proclaimed new 
realities, with the necessity to compete in global markets, and to respond to the 
demands of new individual subjects  for choice in as many spheres of life as 
possible, as its major guidelines.   ‘Traditional’ socialism, whether social 
democratic or  state socialist, was deemed anachronistic, since it was held to 
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depend on  class collectivities which have  largely disappeared,  and on 
acceptance of a passive relationship to state provision which was neither 
desirable nor any longer acceptable.  Because Marxist social analysis had 
always been closely tied to political perspectives of various kinds, and because 
the latter were deemed either wrong or unfeasible, it was assumed that the 
analysis could be thrown out of the window together with the politics.  In the 
debated referred to above,  Tony Giddens gave as a reason for not engaging 
with Marxist analysis of capitalism as a social system that Marxist politics was 
dead. 
 
Yet even if  one sounds like a  troglodyte to say so, perhaps globalisation is best 
understood not as an entity in itself, but is rather a defining  attribute of one 
specific social system, namely  that of modern capitalism.2 It  has only a diffuse 
descriptive meaning outside this frame of reference.  Although of course  there 
are major  technological concomitants  to globalisation, in the new  
communications technologies, and their  ‘overcoming of the limits of time and 
space’,  the fundamental change signified by this term has been the  shift of 
social power (once an important theme in Anthony Giddens’ work)  that has 
taken place since the social crisis of the 1970s. The decisive  change in the 
landscape was  the  defeat of one system of power  (or two, social democracy 
and  state socialism were different) and the triumph of another.  Among its key 
aspects  were the reshaping of the global economic system effected by  the 
deregulation of capital and to a smaller degree commodity markets,  the total 
defeat of Russian and east European Communism, and to a lesser degree of 
‘traditional’ welfarism and social democracy  in the United States and Britain,  
and in some other  countries, in the early 1980s.  New communications 
technologies, given such importance in the theory of globalisation, have been a 
decisive resource by which owners of capital  (themselves an  abstract collective 
                                            
2
 The most important theorist of globalisation, Manuel Castells in his Information Age trilogy  
(1996-1998)  is quite clear he is writing about transformations in a still-existing capitalist order, not 
its supercession.   
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of  property holding interests  - banks, funds, corporate owners etc.)  have been 
able to advance their  interest in the global expansion of the sway of capital.  But 
neither the emergence of these information technologies, nor their diffusion and 
effects (for example in enabling virtually instantaneous international transfers of 
money and capital)   were likely   to have taken place in other than a capitalist 
economic system. Indeed, we can still observe than in other systems, even that 
of the partly-capitalist China, the diffusion of information technologies is still  
resisted. The backwardness of ICT  systems in the Soviet Union is cited by some 
as an explanation of its  collapse.  
 
Economists still attached to Marxist and Ricardian concepts,  like Andrew Glyn 
and Bob Sutcliffe were among the first  to recognise the crisis of social relations 
to which ‘globalisation’ was  a response.  They explained the conflicts and hyper-
inflationary pressures which occurred in the 1970s  (sociologists will remember 
Habermas’s  ‘legitimation crisis’,   political scientists the state of ‘ungovernability’)  
as a consequence of  a falling rate of profit  (relative to labour) following on the 
full employment and growth of the welfare state arising from the Great Boom of 
1950 – 1975.  Andrew Glyn in Capitalism Unleashed: Finance Globalisation and 
Welfare (2006)  analyses the development of capitalism since the 1970s. He 
argues that the ideology of monetarism, the deliberate engineering of 
unemployment,  the relocation of manufacturing industry to locations with 
cheaper labour supplies, the exposure of insulated national economies to the 
forces of the global money and capital markets, all followed as the  strategic 
decisions of capital to defend its own conditions of existence.   
 
Meghnad Desai has argued in Marx’s Revenge (2002)  that the current phase of 
‘globalisation’ is better understood as ‘reglobalisation’, as a return to the free-
market environment of the pre-First World War period, after the ‘short twentieth 
century’ (1914-1989) in which different modes of state autarchy  (Fascist, 
Communist, Social Democratic) obstructed advance of the global market.  Desai 
argues that Marx’s prediction that capitalism would continue its transformation of 
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the world until there is nothing outside  its system  left to transform  is being fully  
vindicated. Marx’s Communist Manifesto (1848) does after all theorise and 
celebrate what we call ‘globalisation’ as its central argument, and its central 
passages still provide its most  succinct description. 3 
 
The Idea of  Capitalism 
 
                                            
3
 “The Bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, 
and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. 
Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first 
condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, 
uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish 
the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed frozen relations, with their train of ancient and 
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated 
before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last 
compelled to face, with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind. 
 
The need for a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the 
whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections 
everywhere. 
 
The bourgoisie has through its exploitation of its world-market given a cosmopolitian character 
to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has 
drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All established 
national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new 
industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by 
industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the 
remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter 
of the globe. In place of old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, 
requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local 
and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal 
interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual 
creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-
mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local 
literatures, there arises a world literature. 
 
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely 
facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. 
The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese 
walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It 
compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels 
them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. 
In one word, it creates a world after its own image.” 
 
From Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto  (1848)  
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What advantages might there be in our continuing to make use of the analytic 
frames of Marxist-influenced sociological  theory to understand the contemporary 
world, as Glyn and Desai unfashionably  believe we should.  How might we 
better understand our situation if we do?  
 
David Lockwood, an eminent sociologist,  argued in a classic  article,   Social 
Integration and System Integration4  in 1964, that  a society can be in state of 
apparent equilibrium or consensus at the level of  norms and beliefs, but 
nevertheless be unstable in terms of what he called ‘system contradictions’.  This 
contribution to sociological theory, unusally bringing together functionalist and 
Marxist concepts, was  put forward at the same time as Lockwood was 
questioning arguments of ‘revisionists’ in the Labour Party (ancestors of the Third 
Way)  that the working class was   becoming bourgeoisified, and that the Party 
should adapt to this change in perceived attitudes.   Lockwood and his co-author, 
John Goldthorpe, of The Affluent Worker (1968),  were arguing at this time that 
working class solidarity might be not disappearing, but instead   changing its 
dominant character.  What they termed ‘expressive solidarity’ was being 
displaced by ‘instrumental solidarity’.  While this was bringing some 
homogenisation of values,  it did not by any means signify the end of class 
conflict.    
 
 
Social Integration and System Integration turned out to be a highly prescient 
article.   Four years later, in  1968, Britain and many other nations of the affluent 
West entered its  most turbulent period of social conflict since the Second World 
War. The appearance of consensus about the goals of consumer  prosperity, and 
the seeming  ‘end of ideology’   (Daniel Bell’s influential book of this title was 
published in  1961)  did not prevent contradictions at a system level  (unresolved 
conflicts of classes, superimposed on newer conflicts between generations and 
                                            
4
 To be found in G.K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch (eds),     Explorations in Social Change (1964).  
 8 
soon genders and ethnicities) giving rise to great  instability, indeed to a state of 
near social breakdown. 5 
 
What implications might this argument have for political analysis today? I am not 
suggesting that the social upheavals whose possibility were theorised in abstract 
terms in Lockwood’s argument of 1964 are to be anticipated in contemporary 
society. There is no reason to suppose that they are. 
 
But  the analytic distinction between ‘social’ and ‘system’ integration nevertheless 
retains its  potency.   It  invites us to consider  the systemic contradictions of the  
present order, as something distinct from the consensus of political and social 
attitudes that its Blair-Cameron-Brown politics may now seem to reflect. It may 
also  identify strategic difficulties not only for New Labour, but for any left-of- 
centre political formation, which tries  to resolve problems which may be 
recognised  as significant  even within its own adaptive  political outlook.  
Consider for example three major issues. 
 
The first is the current levels of social inequality, which New Labour for all its 
efforts has in ten years been able to do more than stabilise at its previous level. 
(It has improved the relative incomes of the poorest ten percent  of the 
population, but been unable or unwilling  to restrain the rapid growth in incomes 
and wealth of the richest ten percent.)  Educational outcomes and therefore 
employment prospects  for the lowest third of population remain obstinately poor.   
 
The second is an emergent  crisis of  social solidarity, reflected in recent 
arguments (by Avner Offer and Richard Layard for example)  to the effect that 
improvements in living standards seem to be accompanied by no increases in 
                                            
5
 Goldthorpe wrote an acute sociological analysis of the inflationary crisis of the 1970s, explaining 
it as the outcome of an unresolvable conflict of social classes over  the distribution of wealth. 
(‘The Current Inflation: Towards a Sociological Account’ , in The Political Economy of Inflation, 
ed. J,. Goldthorpe and F. Hirsch  1978.)   
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self-reported happiness, but on the contrary by social epidemics of crime, clinical 
depression, family breakdown, addictions to drugs, alcohol and gambling, and 
obesity.6  The social response to this diminished solidarity is moral panic and 
hysteria aroused by perceived threats to security and well-being -  from drug-
dealers,  terrorists, paedophiles, asylum seekers,  and street criminals.  
Fundamentalist religion may be one form of   ‘psychic retreat’ or rescue from the 
anxieties aroused by this situation of anomie,  the emergence of ‘virtual 
communities of feeling’ like those mobilised in response to the death of Princess 
Diana and by the abduction of Madeleine McCann, is another. 
 
And  the third is the environmental crisis, and its now obvious dangers.There 
may be widespread agreeement about the relevance of these three issues, and 
about the desirability of addressing them through policies and interventions. 
Indeed Anthony Giddens in Over To You Mr Brown puts forward or endorses 
proposals relevant to all of them.  
 
But it is surely necessary to address  the  systemic difficulties or structural 
resistances that  appear whenever we try to address these problems, if we are to 
have much hope of resolving them.  One could say that the frenetic style of much  
New Labour policy-making has been a form of manic denial of structural 
contradictions,  just as  Brown’s ‘stealth taxes’  to help the poorest  may have 
been his  means of circumventing  them. 
 
Here are some examples of what I mean.  In a globalised economy, whose 
leading edge is its financial sector, how can one compress differentials of income 
and wealth and demand more  corporate responsibility, without leading this most 
footloose and mobile form of capitalism to respond by its own counter-action, for 
example by transferring  its activities  to more tax-friendly locations? This is 
                                            
6
 On this debate, see M. Rustin, ‘What’s Wrong with Happiness’, in  Soundings 36 Summer 2007. 
.  
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surely  part of the logic of informational capitalism, the self-interested behaviour 
of what Thomas Friedman, one of its advocates, described in The Lexus and the 
Olive Tree  as  the ‘electronic herd’.   
 
Similarly, how far is diminished social solidarity not the outcome of this same  
economic and ideological system,  on which Britain and other affluent nations in 
fact depend for their prosperity?  Don’t attempts to create more inclusive and 
supportive communities founder not only on inequality, but also on the induced 
egoism of consumer societies,  the reluctance of people  to sacrifice their relative 
advantages (e.g. access to better schools or neighbourhoods) for  a fading sense 
of a common good?  Isn’t the problem with offering the  equivalent of ‘consumer 
choice’ in public goods the fact that people often want services, for example  
schools, which are not merely good in  absolute terms, but which will  confer 
relative  advantage, in a competitive and anxiety-ridden society, on themselves 
and their families?   Thus ‘consumer choice’  can unwittingly  be a  driver of  
social inequality  and separation.      
 
And one need go no further than the arguments over the contribution of cheap 
and massively expanding air travel to global warming, and the reluctance of 
government to curb this because of  its contribution  to economic growth, to see 
the connection between the risk to the environment and the functioning of global 
market society. 
It need not follow  that such contradictions, because they exist,  are unresolvable.  
They may not be, as the growing mobilisation of concerns about global warming 
may indicate.   What is surely clear is that such contradictions need to be  faced,  
not  mystified or glossed over,  through  formulations which make even the idea 
of structural  obstacles to desirable changes  unthinkable.    
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There may be a possible gain in the transition from the Blair to the Brown era, in 
a willingness to engage in more open debate on these questions, and  perhaps 
also in a diminished admiration for the more acquisitive aspects of global 
capitalism.  
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